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Conflicting Views of Terrorismt
Shibley Telhamitt
The shift in America's mood in the months following that horrific day in
September was breathtaking in its scope and unprecedented in its speed.
From the strongest sense of vulnerability in recent history to the most stri-
dent self-confidence in memory after the seemingly easy success in top-
pling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the journey took but a few
months.
At some level this rapid journey was healing to a nation whose confi-
dence had been painfully shaken. At another level it was troubling. Cer-
tainly America has experienced many radical swings in its foreign policy in
the past. But from the isolationism that followed World War I-carried out
to a disastrous extreme, as witnessed in Pearl Harbor-to the ensuing
interventionism that ended with the quagmire in Vietnam, the swings were
almost generational. Rarely have such extreme shifts in mood been more
rapid than in the autumn of 2001-and, perhaps, rarely as consequential.
Neither extreme is justified by reality. The United States remains the
most powerful nation in the world today, but it is not powerful enough to
confront the new global challenges alone or to justify the overconfidence
that followed the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The rapid-
ity of these mood shifts can in part be explained by the absence of a com-
peting superpower and by the general speed of today's world. The
information revolution carried the horror to every home worldwide within
hours. The technological revolution enabled a remarkable military success
with minimal American casualties thousands of miles from U.S. shores.
But these very factors that have led to bolstering a unilateralist trend in
America's foreign policy have also raised global concerns about America's
role in the world. There has been an equally dramatic shift in the global
mood from empathy with America's pain and a sense of global vulnerabil-
ity immediately after the attacks on the United States in September 2001 to
a widening gap between America and other states. Resentment of U.S.
power has grown in much of the world, and certainly in the Middle East.
Understandably, much of the American focus has been on the atti-
tudes of the Middle East and Muslim countries, especially on the question
many Americans have instinctively asked: "Why do they hate us so much?"
But before addressing this question, and whether it is indeed true at all that
"they hate us so much," we must put the Middle East in a global perspec-
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tive. Although there are some unique aspects in the Middle Eastern view of
the United States, it is also important to understand that much of the reac-
tion of Arabs and Muslims to America's war on terrorism, and to American
foreign policy more broadly, has not been significantly different from the
reaction of people in other regions of the world.
It is not helpful to assume that the global reaction to America's mood
in its declared war on terrorism is mere whining. And it is even more dan-
gerous to assume that the global sentiment is inconsequential in light of
America's significant powerful resources. Aside from the increased motiva-
tion for other states to coalesce in order to challenge America's power if
America is seen to be embarking on a unilateralist course, the nature of the
threat revealed by the horror of 9/11 cannot be addressed through coercive
power alone. This issue is at the heart of the conflict of views between the
United States and many other states in defining the terrorist threat that the
world faces today. Indeed, the evolution of the degree of empathy with the
United States in the months following September 2001 has been in large
part a function of the evolving American view of the war on terrorism.
Conflicting Views of Terrorism
There are five significant differences between the views put forth by the
United States and those of much of the world. In the rest of this article, I
will highlight these key differences that explain the conflict between the
United States and others over the most effective means to address terrorist
threats.
Much of the world empathized with America's pain and supported its
right of self-defense in light of the horrific attacks but did not see that right
as enabling America to unilaterally define global terrorism beyond the
immediate threat to its own soil.
The United States focused its effort in fighting terrorism in con-
fronting the "supply side" of terrorism without equally addressing the
"demand side," which many around the world see as critical.
The Bush administration defined terrorism as if it were an ideology, a
political coalition, when in fact most around the world understand it to be
an immoral means employed by diverse groups for different ends.
In the U.S. view the central terrorist threat resides in "terrorist states,"
and some U.S. officials talk as if confronting those states could result in
the defeat of the terror phenomenon. However, most around the world
view terrorism as the antistate, as an increasingly threatening phenomenon
in part because of the relative weakening of the state in an era of
globalization.
The public discourse in America has associated terrorism in the Mid-
dle East, especially the suicide bombings, with aspects of the Islamic relig-
ion, even as President Bush has been careful to reject this notion, whereas
many around the world see both the motives and the means of Middle East-
ern terrorism to be less about Islam than about politics.
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1. The Two Separate Missions
In the weeks following the events of 9/11, expressions of empathy with the
United States pervaded the international community, including the Middle
East. Even countries with whom the United States has had tense and often
confrontational relationships, such as Iran, which remains on the State
Department's list of "terrorist states," expressed unusual sympathy with
America's pain. Iranian President Mohammad Khatami immediately
issued a condemnation of "the terrorist attacks" and expressed "deep sor-
row and sympathy" for the victims. Syria's young President Bashar Assad
sent a letter of condolence to President Bush strongly condemning the ter-
ror attacks. In general, most leaders and governments recognized that the
United States had a right to respond to the terror on its soil once the cul-
prits were identified. But it is important to understand the sources of the
early global support for America and why much of this support turned to
resentment as the United States moved to define and wage its global war on
terrorism.
Undoubtedly much of the sympathetic reaction was genuine, even as
some harbored a wicked sense of satisfaction that America was now tasting
what many around the world have suffered for too long. The magnitude of
the human tragedy was inescapable given that the horror was transmitted
almost live on television screens in much of the world. But the response
was more than mere humanitarian reflex. America's vulnerability was in
some ways the world's vulnerability. If such horror could befall the sole
remaining superpower, then no one is immune. If the anchor of the inter-
national system is shaken, so is the entire global system. Even in the Mid-
dle East, where many already resented America and in some instances
found pleasure in its pain, other voices saw the threat to the United States
as a threat to them as well, not merely because America was seen as the
anchor of the global system but also because it represented a dream to
which many aspired. Though U.S. policy continued to receive criticism on
the pages of newspapers in the Middle East, a columnist of the influential
Arabic daily al-Hayat, for example, expressed his emotions this way on Sep-
tember 19, 2001: "The destruction of America is the destruction of the
human dream across the world." In the Middle East, as in much of the
world, there was, at least for a moment, a widespread sense eloquently
expressed by one Frenchwoman that "today, we are all American."
Above all, it was clear that most governments around the world recog-
nized America's right to respond with force. No state, let alone a super-
power, could allow an attack of this magnitude to remain unanswered. No
one could deny America's fundamental right of self-defense, regardless of
how they viewed or defined terrorism.
This is not to say that most around the world felt that America should
have a free hand in waging a global war on terrorism. Indeed, much of the
early public reaction in the Middle East, as the United States geared up for
its war on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, was predicated on the
assumption that the United States had presented insufficient evidence to
prove responsibility, even though the Taliban regime had been highly
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unpopular in the broader Arab and Muslim worlds. Though many govern-
ments in the Middle East supported the U.S. campaign, their public
remained unpersuaded.
In the end, despite public distrust of America's intentions, at least in
the Middle East, America's right to respond to the horror was strong
enough to attract significant support from states for the campaign to over-
turn the Taliban regime and destroy Usama bin Laden's al-Qaeda. Even
such states as Iran offered support for these operations, together with doz-
ens of nations across the globe, especially in the Middle East, which partic-
ipated in intelligence gathering, financial coordination, or providing help
for the actual conduct of operations. Certainly, part of this governmental
support was provided to avoid being targeted by a wounded and angry
America. But few governments around the world seriously challenged the
legitimacy of the first mission of responding to the attack by destroying al-
Qaeda.
The White House defined another mission as an integral part of the
global war on terrorism. In principle, this mission too received universal
support, as shown by the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1373
on September 28, 2001, obligating states to fight terrorism. But such a
resolution was possible only because member states did not have to tackle
the issue of defining terrorism. One thing was clear: Many states among
those voting for the resolution did not see eye to eye with the United States
on such a definition. Many feared that "terrorism" would become a conve-
nient shorthand for the United States and other nations to label their
enemies.
The United States commanded international moral authority after the
September attacks to begin to find common ground in defining terrorism,
even though there was no agreement about how to identify "terrorist
groups." The administration needed to decide which of the thousands of
terrorist groups around the world it would define as enemies. President
Bush refined this second mission by concentrating on terrorist groups with
"global reach." But a central issue remained: which organizations to target.
States differ widely on what they consider a "terrorist" group. Some gov-
ernments classify mere opposition groups as terrorist. Others have refused
to accept the U.S. classification scheme. The United States faced the prob-
lem of how to classify some of the Iraqi opposition groups that it supports,
or the Lebanese militant group, Hezbollah, that it opposes. Most in the
Middle East deny that Hezbollah is a terrorist organization because its pri-
mary targets have been Israeli soldiers on Lebanese soil. America can dis-
regard the arguments of other states and target whichever terrorist
enterprise it wants, but it would increasingly find itself alone in the pursuit
of terrorists, an opening that such groups would exploit.
By focusing its efforts on identifying "terrorist groups," the United
States may have missed an opportunity to rally members of the UN Secur-
ity Council behind a clearer definition of "terrorism" as an instrument. A
good example is the Hezbollah organization in Lebanon. If the United
States seeks to mobilize other states and to demand that they end their
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support for Hezbollah because the United States defines it as a "terrorist
organization," the strategy is unlikely to work. Regardless of the methods
that Hezbollah employs, states such as Iran are unlikely to sever their rela-
tions with the group or to seek its destruction. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is a
political party with significant support and several members in the parlia-
ment. It is also a religious movement with deep religious links with Iran.
Its stated objectives of forcing Israel out of the occupied Arab territories are
accepted and applauded in much of the Middle East beyond Iran, and
many in the region consider its methods, which have largely focused on
attacking Israeli soldiers on Lebanese soil, not to be "terrorism." Hence it
is difficult, if not impossible, to envision full regional cooperation if the
American aim is to confront the group and eliminate all support for it. On
the other hand, if American efforts focus on defeating "terrorist means"
defined as the deliberate targeting of civilians, the United States would
have a better chance of succeeding. If the United States rallies the interna-
tional community to apply the principle universally, it stands a good
chance of persuading other states to pressure Hezbollah and dissuade it
from using terrorist instruments and to delegitimize those instruments
even inside Lebanon.
The United States had alternatives: first, to work with the United
Nations and other international and regional organizations to pass resolu-
tions prohibiting the targeting of civilians and strengthening existing
norms that hold a state accountable for criminal acts committed by ter-
rorists operating from its territory. Second, it could build on the antiter-
rorist coalition it had rallied to create a comprehensive new treaty regime-
going beyond the existing patchwork of agreements that require individual
states to either prosecute or extradite terrorists by mandating a strong col-
lective response to attacks on civilians. Such a response targeting both the
perpetrators and the states that support them could take various forms,
including intelligence sharing, asset freezes, economic sanctions, expulsion
from international organizations, and criminal prosecution. In this way a
deliberate attack on civilian targets in one state would become an attack
on all. States outside the coalition could ratify the treaty.
Such a treaty would not take away a state's right to self-defense when
attacked but would add an obligation to take collective action. The differ-
ence is this: When you attack a state, you are at war with that state and its
allies; when you deliberately attack civilians, you are at war with the entire
international community and deserve an automatic international response.
While there will always be ambiguities, the deterrent power of a mandatory
collective response should be considerably stronger than the threat of uni-
lateral action by a nation attacked by terrorists. More important, by mov-
ing in this direction, the international community would go a long way
toward delegitimizing the deliberate targeting of civilians by terrorists.
And by focusing on targeting civilians, rather than on the identity or moti-
vations of the perpetrators, we could avoid the difficult and divisive
debates about what constitutes terrorism and about which groups are ter-
rorist and which "freedom fighters."
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It was clear that the disadvantage of a multilateral approach would be
that it would constrain the American ability to identify terrorist groups and
to prioritize which should be confronted first. This process was in part a
function of the blurring of difference between "terrorists" and "enemies."
It was as if when a group or a state were not identified as terrorist, the
United States would lose its right to treat it as a hostile enemy. Certainly,
whether or not Iran or Iraq are labeled as "terrorist states," the United
States has a right to regard them as enemies and to construct its policy
toward them accordingly. The United States also has a right to treat
Hezbollah, which has killed Americans, as an enemy-regardless of how
others view this organization.
The unilateral U.S. approach to identifying terrorist groups beyond al-
Qaeda was bolstered by the early success in destroying the Taliban regime
in Afghanistan. The surprisingly easy achievement seemed to confirm the
view that America can go it alone in the era of the single superpower. The
impressive performance by high-tech weapons enabled the speedy conduct
of a war in a remote and difficult land that had defeated even the mighty
Soviet army next door. The awareness that the collapse of the Soviet Union
has only widened the gap in military technology between the United States
and the rest of the world emboldened those who believe that America can
afford to act alone. Nowhere has this attitude been more clearly visible
than in the U.S. debate about the policy toward Iraq, where the White
House and Pentagon instinct is to prepare for a war to topple the govern-
ment of Saddam Hussein even as most states around the world rejected the
idea. The unilateralists have a ready argument: Because America is so pow-
erful, few will oppose it if it decides to act even if they do not like its
actions. No one can afford to be on the losing side, and America is ulti-
mately assured of winning. Regardless of the actual merits of this argu-
ment, it is not hard to see that such an approach would engender anything
but significant international resentment.
2. The Supply-and-Demand Sides of Terrorism
A second reason for the gap between the United States and much of the rest
of the world is in the way the United States approached the terrorism phe-
nomenon. By regarding terrorism as the product of organized groups that
could be confronted and destroyed, without regard to their aims or to the
reasons that they succeed in recruiting many willing members, the United
States pursued a "supply-side"-only approach.
It is clear that the White House view of terrorism was colored by the
9/11 attacks. It was hard, in the state in which Americans found them-
selves, to contemplate the thought that the horror could be rationally
explained. It is often feared that to explain is to justify. It is an under-
standable fear that is also ultimately self-defeating. In explaining such
actions, one hopes to reduce the chance of more horror.
It is certainly the case that Usama bin-Laden's al-Qaeda, even aside
from its tactics of violent terror, has objectives that are irreconcilable not
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only with what America stands for but also with the state system as it now
exists in the Middle East. It seeks to destabilize the system, to overthrow
governments in the region, to fashion an Islamist political order to its lik-
ing. It is hard to see how one can reduce the threat of this organization
without seeking its disruption. It is a supplier of terror that must be
directly confronted.
But aside from the aims of bin-Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders, there
is a "demand side" to terrorism. To succeed, terror organizers, regardless
of their aims, need to recruit willing members, raise funds, and appeal to
public opinion in pursuit of their political objectives. Public despair and
humiliation are often fertile ground for terror organizers to exploit. If this
demand side persists, the terrorism phenomenon is unlikely to be con-
tained. For every terror organization that is destroyed, other suppliers will
arise to exploit the persistent demand.
It is important to note that there need not be harmony between the
real aims of terror organizers and the causes of despair and humiliation
that give rise to the demand side. Usama bin-Laden's aims, for example,
were fundamentally focused on expelling foreign forces from Saudi Arabia
and creating an Islamic political order across the Muslim world. But once
Usama bin-Laden needed to rally public opinion in the region in the after-
math of 9/11, he did not employ his grand objectives as the primary argu-
ments for mobilizing support. Instead, he highlighted issues that resonate
with the public and that explain more fully the sense of despair and humili-
ation among Arabs and Muslims: the Arab-Israeli issue and sanctions
against Iraq. Put differently, it is difficult to envision how one can address
the terrorism phenomenon without addressing the central issues that cre-
ate the fertile grounds for breeding terrorism and are exploited by
organizers who may have ambitions of their own. Much of the world sees
the U.S. war on terrorism as being limited to a military campaign against
suppliers without investing in the necessary political and economic instru-
ments to reduce the central demand side.
3. Terrorism as an Instrument Versus Terrorism as an Ideology
President Bush's speech to the American people a few days after the
attacks, on September 20, 2001, was forceful and inspiring. It helped
Americans begin dealing with their pain and fear. But in rallying the pub-
lic for the declared war on terrorism and preparing it for the required cost,
the speech spoke eloquently of terrorism as another "ism" of history and of
terrorists as ideologues: "They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies
of the twentieth century... they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism,
and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way to where it
ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies." Although this
approach succeeded in mobilizing public support in America, it soon
became clear that others around the world see the terrorism phenomenon
differently. The differences are especially consequential for policy.
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In the ensuing months, the Bush administration has been waging the
global war on terrorism as if terrorism is a movement, an ideology, or a
political coalition, with little differentiation between cases. This approach
has distorted our moral view of the world and enabled even Slobodan
Milosevic, the former Yugoslav president, as he faced international justice,
to justify his horrific policies of death and ethnic cleansing as a war on
terrorism.
Much of the world sees terrorism differently: as an instrument, not a
movement; as an immoral means employed by groups, some of which have
just causes, some of which don't.
To reduce its occurrence, according to this approach, terrorism must
be internationally delegitimized and the conditions under which it thrives
minimized. By definition, legitimacy and illegitimacy cannot be unilater-
ally decided; when the United States appears to go against the rest of the
world, it is its actions that appear illegitimate.
The argument against terrorism is essentially moral: To dissuade
others from using such tactics, one has to speak with moral authority.
Those with legitimate causes who condone terrorism as a method to serve
their ends see terrorism as a weapon of the weak and helpless facing a far
stronger enemy. Certainly, those in the Middle East who have often sup-
ported operations by Palestinian groups against Israelis, including attacks
against civilians, regard those operations not as terrorism but as acts of
national liberation. This perspective has been a central point of contention
between the United States and many individuals and entities in the region,
including governments. Many in the Middle East as well as in other parts
of the world make the point that the definition of terrorism cannot be fully
divorced from the degree to which the aim of the group is legitimate, and
from the degree to which the power of the enemy it faces is overwhelmingly
superior. Terrorism is seen as the weapon of the desperate and weak.
This notion should be challenged, as the United States has been trying
to do: Terrorist means must be rejected regardless of their aims. But any
successful effort to reduce the appeal of terrorism must also persuade peo-
ple and groups not of the illegitimacy of their cause but of the illegitimacy
of their means. The argument is moral: The ends, no matter how worthy,
cannot justify the means. In particular, the argument boils down to the
notion that the deliberate attack on civilian targets is unacceptable under
any circumstances.
But to persuade others of this worthy notion, those who make the
argument must speak with moral authority. And for the argument to be
more persuasive, others with moral authority must also use it. This tactic
requires an appeal to societies, and it requires multilateral efforts to estab-
lish the notion of the illegitimacy of terrorist means. But the understanda-
ble focus on destroying al-Qaeda, and the focus on terrorists as a breed that
can be separated from society, has undermined the American ability to
delegitimize terrorism. One of the unfortunate products of what transpired
in the months after 9/11 is that whereas terrorist organizations, especially
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al-Qaeda, have been disrupted, terrorist means are increasingly legitimate
in the eyes of more people in the Middle East.
A good case in point occurred as the United States was attempting to
encourage Arab governments to speak against terrorism carried out by Pal-
estinian groups in Israel following a spate of horrific suicide bombings
that killed many in the spring of 2002. This was an important and worthy
American effort consistent with the moral notion that the ends cannot jus-
tify such horrible means. The U.S. efforts intensified after major Israeli
incursions into Palestinian cities in the West Bank that led to dozens of
civilian casualties and much destruction of property. Both the suicide
bombings and the Israeli operations were universally criticized, especially
by human rights groups that saw severe violations of international law and
norms that killed and injured many civilians. The Bush administration's
focus only on the need to respond to terrorist attacks hindered its ability to
emphasize the moral limits that must also be imposed on the response.
The American obligation to project empathy with the innocent casualties
on the Palestinian side was forgotten. As a result, the ability of the United
States to persuade peoples and governments in the Middle East to effec-
tively reject terrorism was significantly undermined.
In justifying the American demand that Israel should withdraw from
Palestinian cities without delay, President Bush spoke only of possible
"consequences" of continued Israeli operations but not of the moral wrong
of the unjustified scale and scope of Israeli operations and the means Israel
had used. In asking Israel to withdraw after a week of its military cam-
paign in the West Bank, the president argued on April 4, 2002, that the
situation in which Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat found himself "is largely
of his own making." He put his request this way: "Israel is facing a terrible
and serious challenge. For seven days, it has acted to root out terrorist
nests. America recognizes Israel's right to defend itself from terror. Yet, to
lay the foundations of future peace, I ask Israel to halt incursions into Pal-
estinian-controlled areas and begin the withdrawal from those cities it has
recently occupied."
In our approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, we have taken a
clear moral position toward Palestinian terrorism that goes like this: The
Palestinians must be restrained in their response to the hardship that they
endure daily after thirty-five years of occupation and to the humiliation
that an entire generation experiences today. Although they have a right to
seek freedom, they have no right to use terrorist tactics that inflict so much
horror on many innocent people. The ends can never justify the means.
This is a worthy moral position.
Then we turn to the Israelis as we watch the horror that they endure in
the face of suicide bombings. We understand that they must respond in
some way, but we act as if they can respond in any way they choose. We do
not impose the moral limitations of demanding such actions must not be
sweeping, that they must be less hurtful to the hundreds of thousands of
innocent Palestinians who suffer the consequences. In fact, we take no
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moral position and appear to give a blank check. Our global moral author
ity is undermined as a result.
In the process, the ability of regional governments to help delegitimize
terrorism is also undermined. During the same bloody events in April
2002, for example, the president asked Arab leaders to speak out against
terrorism. He dispatched Secretary of State Colin Powell to visit friendly
Arab states, including Jordan and Egypt, with the hope that they would
issue such statements in Powell's presence. The trouble was that television
stations in the region, over which these governments often have little con-
trol, were broadcasting live the destruction in West Bank cities, tanks roll-
ing over houses, and heartbreaking reports of dozens of civilian
casualties-even as television reports in Israel focused on the innocent vic-
tims of terrorist bombings. Hundreds of thousands of people demon-
strated in the Arab world, including one million in Morocco. Callers and
commentators on television shows blamed America for its inability to stop
the campaign and for not displaying sympathy with Arab pain. They
labeled Arab leaders friendly to the United States, such as President
Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan, as "servants of America."
Regardless of the merits of these feelings and perceptions, when Arab lead-
ers criticized Palestinian terrorism in that environment in response to. pub-
lic American pressure, they further delegitimized themselves rather than
terrorism.
Whereas we ignored the moral dimension of Israeli actions, we chose
to evaluate Palestinian behavior only in that dimension. This bias has
handicapped our ability to perceive the need to put forth serious political
alternatives to violence even as we rightly demand that terrorism must
stop. Terrorism cannot be justified under any circumstances, but it is
more likely to take root when peaceful alternatives to alleviating hardship
are not readily available. Any successful strategy to minimize terrorism
must include putting forth a positive alternative. To pretend that the issue
of terrorism is simply a choice between good and evil is to know nothing of
human psychology. In 2002, nearly half of Israelis supported the immoral
notion of expelling all Palestinians from their homes as a way of stopping
the unbearable horror of suicide terror because they saw no peaceful solu-
tion on the horizon, and many Palestinians supported terror as a way of
ridding themselves of the unbearable pain of occupation. This was not the
case before the collapse of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in the sum-
mer of 2000. Evidence suggests that providing hope for an alternative
means is a factor in reducing terrorism: Despite the reservations that both
sides had about the peace process in the Palestinian-Israeli arena and the
continuation of violence even then, .the number of terrorist incidents in the
Middle East declined every year during the second half of the 1990s, reach-
ing its lowest point in the promising years of 1999-2000.
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4. Role of States Versus Nonstate Actors
While the threat posed by bin Laden was in part dependent on a sponsor-
ing state, Afghanistan under the Taliban government, it is also clear that al-
Qaeda is a nonstate organization that operates even in nations where it
does not receive official support. The U.S. State Department typically
issues lists of terrorist groups and also of "terrorist states," but the Ameri-
can focus has increasingly shifted to the role of states. This shift was
shown by President Bush's designation of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as
"an axis of evil" in his State of the Union speech on January 29, 2002, and
by the focus on the need to overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein
in Iraq as a cornerstone of American antiterrorism policy.
This focus on confronting hostile states as a priority of the war on
terrorism has not been equally shared in the broader international commu-
nity because the attacks of 9/11 highlighted the vulnerability of states to
nonstate terrorism in the era of globalization. This is not to say that states
do not remain the most powerful players in international politics in most
areas. However, the technological revolution, especially the information
revolution, which has empowered individuals and substate groups in new
ways, has made terrorism more likely and potentially much more lethal. It
is much easier to deter states, even ambitious ones such as Iraq, than it is
to deter shadowy groups or individuals. Even the Stalinist Soviet Union
was deterred by American power and resolve because states ultimately are
sensitive to punishment, and punishment is easier to specify when one
knows who the actor is.
Terrorism thrives in anarchy: the weaker the central authority, the
more numerous the militant groups and the more difficult it is to deter
such groups, as one does not know whom to punish. Witness, for exam-
ple, the contrast between Syria and Lebanon: Syria is a militarily powerful
state with an authoritarian government that keeps tight control over the
country; Lebanon is small, militarily weak, and ethnically divided, with a
government that has only loose control over parts of the state. Despite the
professed hostility between Syria and Israel, which was far greater than the
professed hostility between the Lebanese government and Israel, there have
been practically no terrorist attacks across the Syrian-Israeli border but
dozens of such attacks across the Lebanese-Israeli border. Despite its sig-
nificant and overwhelming power, Israel was unable to end these attacks
even after it invaded Lebanon in 1982 and occupied that country for nearly
two decades. However, Israeli power has succeeded in deterring direct
attacks emanating from Syria.
This is not to say that states have no role in supporting violent groups
outside their own borders, but violence, including terrorism, is more likely
to emanate from weakened states, even without support from outside pow-
ers. Afghanistan provides a good example. During the days of Soviet occu-
pation, the communist government in Afghanistan was less likely to export
terrorism than Afghanistan was in the years that followed the disintegra-
tion of that state and the emergence of the Taliban regime. Violence is
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easier to deter when it emanates from states that maintain strong domestic
control than when it is nurtured in weak or collapsing states.
This contrast suggests important aspects of a strategy intended to
reduce terrorism. The first is that when confronting hostile states, such as
Iraq, any strategy must assure an outcome that does not produce the sort
of instability that is hospitable to terrorism. Second, it is not enough to
limit the opportunities available to potential terrorist groups-the issue of
motivation is also central. Even if opportunities for terrorism become lim-
ited through effective military means, the degree to which people are driven
to extremes affects the likelihood that they will succeed. When there is a
will, there is a way.
5. Gap in Understanding Middle Eastern Terror
The Role of Religion.
Understandably, the attacks of September 11 have raised many questions
about the motivation of those willing to commit such atrocities against the
United States. Inevitably, a debate ensued about the relationship between
Islam as a religion and culture and the propensity to commit terror. After
all, those who carried out the attacks and their sponsors professed to be
fulfilling a religious mission.
One of the most important positions taken by President Bush in the
early days following the horror was his attempt to set the record straight, to
differentiate between those few terrorists and Muslims broadly. This
important position helped not only in enabling cooperation between the
United States and Muslim countries that were equally frightened by al-
Qaeda but also to reduce the backlash in America against Muslim and Arab
Americans.
However, despite these attempts, the discourse in America quickly
blurred the distinction. When the question of "why they hate us so much"
was raised, "they" increasingly meant Arabs and Muslims, not merely those
individuals who carried out the attack. In some quarters the mood was
even more dramatic: The editor of the influential conservative National
Review, Rich Lowry, openly discussed the option of "nuking Mecca" if
there is another large terrorist attack on the United States, though he also
acknowledged that such an attack "seems extreme." The prominent com-
mentator Fred Ikle, a former undersecretary of Defense, concluded an op-
ed article in the Wall Street Journal Uune 2, 2002) this way: "A nuclear war
stirred up against the 'infidels' might end up displacing Mecca and Medina
with two large radioactive craters." Although these writings were by no
means the norm in America, they were highlighted in the Muslim and Arab
worlds as if they were American policy, thus generating more resentment
toward the United States. In the logic of these writers, the issue was how to
deter future attacks and the right of the United States to retaliate in case of
such attacks; from the point of view of Muslims worldwide, such writings
confused the actions of a few radical Muslims with the Muslim faith and
conceived of Islam, not the terrorists, as America's enemy.
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At the heart of this analytical confusion is a genuine fear that followed
the nightmare of watching the horrific attacks as they occurred. It was
hard to explain how anyone could be ruthless enough to design and carry
out such horror, but the revelations about the perpetrators made the situa-
tion even more terrifying: They were willing to die for the cause and thus
were seemingly insensitive to punishment and reward; many were appar-
ently normal men who were relatively well educated and came from mid-
dle-class families; and they had undertaken their mission in the name of
Islam, a religion most Americans knew little about. It is frightening to con-
template confronting ruthless people, but it is even more terrifying to envi-
sion them as mysterious and irrational. This seeming mystery of their
behavior was easy to account for psychologically by references to blind
religious faith, especially when it happens that many of those carrying out
terrorist acts in the Middle East, not just al-Qaeda, are doing so in the
name of Islam.
But an analytical view of the behavior of groups that carry out terror,
especially in historical perspective, clearly indicates that Islam as such is
not at the heart of the propensity to commit such acts. Even the seemingly
incomprehensible phenomenon of using suicide as an instrument of vio-
lence can be accounted for without reference to religion. This is not to say
that religion plays no role, or that many Islamist groups are not dangerous
or hostile, but only that religion's role is not the central issue in under-
standing the terror phenomenon. What makes these groups dangerous is
not their Islamic character but their violent means and intolerant ends. In
contrast, most religious organizations, including political ones in the Mid-
dle East, are not violent. There is nothing wrong with religious fundamen-
talism (whatever the religion); what's wrong is when a group, religious or
otherwise, seeks to impose its will on others through violence.
One of the most radical Palestinian groups in the Middle East in the
late 1960s was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a
secular organization founded by a Christian physician, George Habash.
The PFLP, which engaged in a series of highly publicized airline hijackings,
attracted many well-educated members. The secularism of this group
should be a reminder of the mistaken assumptions many make about the
relationship between the Islamic religion and violence. It is true that relig-
ious groups employing violence find some theological justification for it,
just as their opponents find support for their positions in religious materi-
als. But "theological justification" is not the same thing as "religiously
caused." The Jonestown cult did not represent Christianity any more than
Baruch Goldstein and his supporters represent Judaism. It is telling that
when the violence in the Middle East was carried out by secular national-
ists in the 1950s and 1960s, both the West and intellectuals in the region
saw Islam as a passive religion, an "opiate of the masses" that accepted the
status quo and bolstered stability. The prevalent interpretation was that a
Muslim simply accepted God's will and did not seek to change it, repeating
the phrase "al-Hamdulillah" (Praise be to God) even in the face of great
hardship.
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During that period the United States and the West viewed secular
national movements in the Middle East as the primary destabilizing politi-
cal force in the region and viewed Islamic groups, especially those sup-
ported by friendly governments, as more desirable and more stabilizing.
The Israelis held a similar view after they occupied the West Bank and
Gaza in the 1967 war. They perceived the secular Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) as the primary threat to Israel, so they sought to erode
its influence in the West Bank and Gaza and consequently encouraged
traditional Islamic groups that were competing with the PLO. Those same
Islamic groups ultimately gave birth to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, two mili-
tant movements that were even more ruthless in their use of violence than
the PLO.
Similarly, it is important to keep in mind Usama bin Laden's political
roots. In the 1980s, when the fear of communism and the Soviet Union
still superseded all other perceived threats, the mission of overthrowing the
Soviet-backed communist regime in Afghanistan propelled the United
States to cultivate Islamic groups across the world to fight the regime in
Afghanistan. The United States encouraged these efforts in the name of
jihad, or Islamic struggle, in order to persuade Muslim fighters in places as
far away as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Sudan to join in this global strug-
gle against the infidel communists. Indeed, the Saudi government was
encouraged to help locate fanatically religious people like Usama bin
Laden, especially wealthy ones. The recruitment of global adherents of
Islam to fight what these believers defined as holy wars, a phenomenon
that obviously had unintended horrific consequences, was thus born of a
different interpretation of Islam. The role that many Arab governments
played in mobilizing Islamists, for which they are now criticized, was born
in part out of this collaborative effort with the United States. It is thus not
surprising that most of those who have carried out attacks against the
United States have been citizens of friendly states such as Saudi Arabia and
Egypt rather than hostile states such as Iran or Iraq.
Outside the al-Qaeda phenomenon, it is important to note that Middle
Eastern terrorism and the resentment of the United States, unacceptable as
they remain, are not unique if examined in global perspective. If one sets
aside al-Qaeda as a horrific special case, one will find the global trends in
terrorism to be surprising. According to State Department reports, and
contrary to conventional wisdom, the Middle East was not the leading
region in the number of terrorist incidents (as defined and identified by
the State Department) throughout the 1990s. Nor has it been the leading
area in the number of attacks against American targets. In fact, in the five
years prior to the horror of 9/11 incidents of Middle Eastern terrorism
declined every year, and by 2000 the Middle East had become the region
with the fewest terrorist attacks of any around the globe except North
America. In countering the tendency to associate Islam with terror, one
must keep this global trend in mind.
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Religion and Suicide Terrorism.
The mystery of suicide attacks was compounded by the discovery that
many of the al-Qaeda attackers were well educated and from middle-class
families. This information seemed to go against the popular notion that
participants in political violence come from the uneducated and economi-
cally destitute classes. There is actually little evidence that poverty or lack
of education are major elements in political violence, although they can be
factors in extreme cases. The more central reasons motivating people to
act, and to be recruited by violent groups, are hopelessness and humilia-
tion, which have to do with expectations and interpretations of social and
political relations. These factors are essential in defining the "demand
side" of terrorism.
Historically, those who have employed violence for political ends have
come from the educated and middle classes-whether in the Middle East or
elsewhere. Often seeing themselves as revolutionaries, as in the case of
Marxists such as Che Guevara in Latin America, or George Habash of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the more educated segments
of the public are generally less accepting of an inferior position in politics
and society and are also more aware of their capacity to effect change.
They are thus more likely to act on their beliefs, although most use nonvio-
lent means.
One of the seemingly most puzzling aspects of the terrorist attacks on
the United States was the use of suicide. It is easy, in this case, to escape
the need to explain such apparently irrational behavior by focusing on
Islamic theology-but there are rational explanations. First, theology can-
not explain suicide as a method of terrorism, though the perpetrators and
their supporters may have twisted religion to suit their ends and to brush
aside the basic Islamic doctrine prohibiting suicide. One could just as eas-
ily create twisted biblical interpretations to justify the creation of a Chris-
tian or Jewish cult that exploits the biblical story of Samson's death.
Second, if it is assumed that Muslims do not fear death because they
believe they will be rewarded in heaven and therefore are more likely than
others to accept dying, we need look no further than our television screens
in the lead-up to the American military operations in Afghanistan: Hun-
dreds of thousands of faithful Muslims were trying to flee Afghanistan in
fear for their lives. Bin Laden's own recruitment tapes that he distributes
in the Arab world show that his primary means of motivating his support-
ers is to show pictures of dead Muslims in Palestine, Iraq, and Chechnya to
move his audience into action.
Third, suicide bombings have not been unique to Islamic groups,
either historically or recently. Certainly the suicide bombers in the Middle
East in recent years have come from Islamist groups, and they do employ
the concept of martyrdom to explain and justify their actions. But it is
often forgotten that the PFLP and other militant secular Palestinian groups
(which included Christians) in the 1950s and 1960s were called fedayeen,
or those who sacrifice their lives. Historically, other groups and people
have employed suicide, such as the Japanese in World War II. Although the
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focus on the Middle East is understandable, what's overlooked is that the
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, who are neither Arab nor Muslim, and who
describe themselves as "a national liberation organization... [who] are not
[so] mentally demented as to commit blind acts of violence impelled by
racist and religious fanaticism" have employed suicide bombings as an
instrument of violence more than any other group in the world, including
in the Middle East.
Ultimately, suicide bombings are employed by violent groups for two
reasons: They are effective, and they are empowering. From the perspective
of individual actors, suicide as a method is strictly irrational; from the
point of view of a ruthless group, it is terrifyingly efficient. Bin Laden's
organization must be seen as a cult because its method of persuasion is
akin to brainwashing, although any person willing to die has individual
reasons, and some, including secularists, as has been documented in the
Palestinian case, actively seek organizations to help them carry out suicide
attacks. When a group is willing to employ ruthless methods and to kill on
a large scale, the sacrifice of group members is a horrifyingly effective tac-
tic because it is very difficult to defend against. It is difficult to deter or
punish individuals who are willing to die, and it is nearly impossible to
stop episodes of terrorism if individuals are willing to use their bodies as
weapons. In that sense, the seeming irrationality of suicide violence (i.e.,
its seeming insensitivity to punishment and reward) renders it a rational
strategy from the point of view of those already willing to commit ruthless
acts of violence. Even from the point of view of total casualties, the group
will lose fewer fighters and inflict more casualties on its enemies than if it
used means such as guerrilla warfare.
The horrific effectiveness of suicide bombings, especially against
superior enemies, becomes a central factor in attracting new recruits. In
the Palestinian arena in the West Bank and Gaza, the suicide-bombing
method began with Islamist groups, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. By the
spring of 2002, and in the absence of a hopeful political process to alleviate
public despair over the conditions of occupation, secularist groups were
having more difficulty competing with Islamist groups in the recruitment
of members. Thus, they began emulating the suicide method as the PFLP
and the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade-two secular organizations-began to
employ this method, even dispatching women bombers, a practice the
Islamist groups were reluctant to accept. The suicide-bombing phenome-
non has thus become secularized.
It is necessary to understand that suicide bombings, offensive though
they are and ultimately threatening to the very societies that legitimize
them, are also inspiring to many. The true horror of suicide bombings is
that they are immensely empowering to many people who no longer believe
that their governments can do anything to relieve their humiliation and
improve their conditions. The fact that more groups, including secular
ones, now employ this strategy is the result, not the cause, of popular sup-
port for a method first embraced by Islamist groups.
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This message of empowerment is well understood by organizations
that employ suicide bombings. When a teenaged Palestinian girl suicide
bomber left a taped message in March 2002 speaking of "sleeping Arab
armies" and ineffective governments allowing girls to do the fighting, her
handlers knew well how the recording would play among the masses. The
most pervasive psychology in the Arab world today is collective rage and
feelings of helplessness-and the focus of this psychology is the continued
bloodshed in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
In this climate, suicide bombings take root because they free the des-
perate from the need to rely on governments. Rather than being sponsored
by states, this form of violence challenges states. Whatever the aims of the
attacks on the United States, they succeeded in sending an empowering
message to those in the Middle East who are frustrated but are seemingly
resigned to their fate because of the superior strength of their enemies and
their apparent helplessness. Though there were many in that region, espe-
cially among governments and elites, who were threatened by bin Laden
and by the phenomenon that he represented, many among the public were
inspired by what was accomplished: A few men with nothing but box cut-
ters had succeeded in inflicting so much pain on the sole remaining super-
power and in shaking the international order. In so doing, they were also
bound to create change in the Middle East, even if the nature of that change
remained unpredictable. Even if al-Qaeda itself is ultimately defeated,
others are likely to emulate its methods.
In the end, it should be clear that the issues of political violence
broadly and terrorism specifically are not about religion and theology. But
it is undeniable that much of the politically militant action today is carried
out by Islamist groups in the name of Islam and that these groups are on
the ascent, even as nonreligious groups also continue to employ violent
means. The question is why? The answer is hardly mysterious: In the
absence of democracy and legitimate means for organizing political opposi-
tion, people turn to social organizations that are not fully under govern-
mental control, and the mosque is one of the few available vehicles for
mass political mobilization. This point highlights a key dilemma in the
effort to reduce terror: On one extreme, very weak central authority allows
militant organizations to proliferate and be less sensitive to deterrence; on
the other extreme, significant repression increases the motives of individu-
als and groups to use violence and to take greater risks. Repression alone
cannot eliminate terrorism and may even help cultivate it. This has been
the experience of many Middle Eastern states, especially for Israel in its
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Any successful counterterrorism
strategy must thus address both the opportunities available to militants
and the level of their motivation.
Besides limiting the opportunities open to organizers, any effective
strategy must also include two essential components: (1) working with the
international community, especially through international treaties, to
delegitimize attacks on civilians as a political instrument and suicide
attacks as something to be celebrated; and (2) addressing the demand side,
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the legitimate anger and genuine political despair in the Middle East today
that provide fertile ground for terrorists to exploit. As in the 1990s, when
the United States worked with the regional players to begin a credible pro-
cess of resolving regional conflict through negotiations and put forth ideas
for economic development and political change, a new process that
inspires hope must be part of any new strategy. Unless we address the
roots of this anger and despair, new terrorists taking advantage of public
hopelessness could replace the ones we destroy.
There are profound reasons, with regard both to domestic policy and
to foreign policy issues, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict, for people in
the Middle East to be motivated to oppose the existing order. Despair and
humiliation are widespread in the region. People turn to available vehicles
of political organization, sometimes conveniently, sometimes instinctively.
Such despair is the demand side of terrorism: Terrorists who have their
own aims, including personal ambition or greed, can exploit this mood to
recruit members, gain financial support, and show a public that may be
resigned to its condition that change is possible. Understanding the issues
that drive the demand side of terrorism is obviously important, but it is
beyond the scope of this article.
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